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OtSTRiBUTlON OF THIS OGCU^tiT iS UNLIMITEO 
ABSTRACT 
About 10 hours after the March 28^ 1979 Loss-of-Coclant Accident began 
at Three Mile Island Unit 2, a hydrogen deflagration of undetermined extent 
occurred inside the reactor building. Examinations of photographic evi-
dence^ available from the first fifteen entries into the reactor building, 
yieldea preliminary aata on the possible extent and range of hydrogen burn 
damage. These data, although sparse, contributed to development of a pos-
sible damage path and to an estimate of the extent of damage to susceptible 
reactor building items. Further information gathered from analysis of 
additional photographs and samples can provide the means for estimating 
hydrogen source and production rate data crucial to developing a complete 
understanding of the TMI-2 hydrogen deflagration. 
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INVESTIGATION OF HYDROGEN BURN DAMAGE IN 
THE THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING 
BACKGROUND 
About 10 hours after the March 28, 1979 Loss-of-Coolant Accident began 
at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2), a pressure spike of nearly 30 psi and 
associated high temperature indications, along with some pertinent gas 
readings, inoicated that a sudden, brief hydrogen burn (or "deflagration") 
of undetermined extent occurred in the reactor building. Photographs taken 
during preliminary entries into the TMI-2 reactor building showed some 
thermal damage to polymeric materials at apparently random locations 
throughout the reactor building. Indications of overpressure were also 
noted. In subsequent entries, photographers attempted to record as much 
thermal damage as they could conveniently observe while performing other 
assigned duties. 
Fifteen entries into the TMI-2 reactor builoing were made in the 
period between the accident and October 1981. Photographs and video 
recordings from these entries were displayed at a variety of conferences 
and meetings; however, lack of personnel and a necessary commitment to 
radiation surveys and decontamination studies did not allow for ordering of 
photographic data to best display patterns of thermal damage. Such pat-
terns, if any, may reveal spatially distributed thermal exposure informa-
tion and thermal exposure intensity, ascertained from the degree of damage 
to the exposed item. 
The Fire Science Group of the Hazards Control Department at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) contracted with the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) to conduct a preliminary analysis of existing photographs 
of thermally damaged materials in the TMI-2 reactor building. From this 
survey, we attempted to define spatial distribution and extent of thermal 
damage to susceptible reactor-building items. We also were asked to recom-
mena further work that could increase the accuracy of estimates of hydrogen 
deflagration intensity for the purpose of estimating hydrogen concentration 
range in the reactor building just prior to the deflagration. 
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Hydrogen concentration and distribution are not defined in this report. 
Because actual accident pressure and temperature data are uncertain, inter-
pretations of hydrogen distribution in the building just prior to the burn 
vary widely. To reduce the variance in interpretations of hydrogen dis-
tribution, more photographs and actual samples need to be analyzed. Such 
information may provide means to estimate hydrogen source and production 
rate data. This report examines photographic evidence from the first 
15 reactor building entries and suggests a preliminary pattern of burn and 
overpressure damage throughout the TMI-2 reactor building. 
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APPROACH 
Our approach was to segregate and organize existing photographs into 
categories where the pictures showed: (a) items that definitely exhibit 
effects of thermal exposure (charred, sooted, melted, thermally relaxed, 
blistered, discolored, and embrittled items); (b) items susceptible to--but 
not exhibiting--thermal damage; (c) items not susceptible to thermal damage 
at temperature levels found in fires and explosions (we deleted these 
photographs from our analysis); and (d) items that exhibit "blast" or 
overpressure damage. 
Preliminary photographs received at LLNL from the NRC contained only a 
portion of those available at TMl. To expedite progress, two members of 
the Fire Science Group staff traveled to the Department of Energy (DOE) 
Technical Integration Office (TIO) at TMI to survey their file of photo-
graphs and schematics, and to construct preliminary thermal damage 
distribution maps. 
As we sorted and organized photographs, we plotted positions of 
thermal damage on plan view schematics of the reactor building levels. 
Before we left TMI, we developed a list of items to be either photographed 
in detail or removed for critical inspection. This list appears in 
Appendix A. We also developed a list of data which pertain to formation of 
explosive or flammable mixtures of hydrogen and air. This list appears in 
Appendix B. Upon returning to LLNL, we constructed an approximate scale 
model of the reactor building interior using polystyrene foam. Thermal and 
blast damage locations were transcribed from schematics to the model to 
better illustrate spatial location of damage. The model was transported to 
DOE Headquarters on November 9, 1981 to help illustrate the thermal damage 
spectrum for a meeting pertaining to analysis of the TMI-2 hydrogen reac-
tion. After the meeting the model was taken to TMI-2 so that damage data 
from subsequent reactor building entries could be added to existing 
patterns. 
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INVESTIGATION OF DAMAGE PHOTOGRAPHS 
Figures 1 through 30 picture overpressure and thermal damage to compo-
nents and items at various locations in the TMI-2 reactor building. 
Overpressure Damage 
Figures 1 through 5 show overpressure damage in the reactor building. 
Most overpressure damage was in the vicinity of the elevator and enclosed 
stairwell complex on the 305- and 347-fcot elevations. Since no other 
photographea region of the reactor building shewed any overpressure damage 
(e.g., crushing of switch boxes, collapse of hermetic enclosures, light 
bulb or fluorescent light breakage, translation or knocking over of 
untethered items) we conclude that forceful overpressure was localized to 
interior elevator and stairwell locations and nearby regions. 
Figure 1 shows apparently crushed barrels (content unknown) found on 
both sioes of the elevator and enclosed stairwell complex on the 347-foct 
elevation. Such damage could result from a pressure pulse, or possibly 
from heating followed by rapid cooling. Other items in proxiirity did not 
appear aisplaced (except for fallen circumferential bus bars from the 
reactor building polar crane). Pending closer examination, the cause for 
barrel distortion will remain undefined. 
A floor plate in front of the air coolers on the 305-foot elevation 
was displaced from its normal position, thus indicating a slight over-
pressurization pulse in the basement region below the 305-foot elevation. 
The elevator ana enclosed stairwell complex is open to the basement level 
so that the overpressurization pulse that caused elevator and stairwell 
door distortion may be relatea to oisplacement of this floor plate. 
Thermal Damage in the Polar Crane Region 
Figures 6 through 13 show thermal damage to the polar crane: charred 
ana melted bus bar insulation; charred and embrittled labels and hosing; 
burned seat cushions; and blistered, peeled, and charred ceiling paint. 
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Bus bar insulation uniformly melted and charred along the polar crane bus 
complex. Control cab upholstery sustained substantial and uniform burn 
damage. Paint flaking off walls was concentrated at each end of the 
crane. Edges of separated paint charred in some areas. 
The polar crane festoon and control pendant sustained charring along 
its entire length. According to one of the authors of this report, control 
pendant charring existed as far down the pendant line as he could see. 
However, thermal damage was not noted at the pendant control end at the top 
level of the D-ring personnel shield. 
Dislocation of conductors from the circumferential bus bar ring was 
most evident at the polar crane ends, and may have been caused by thermal 
relaxation of insulation "stand-offs." Charring of bus insulation was 
obvious on the bus bars which fell to the 347-foot elevation floor from 
circumferential attachments across the south end of the reactor building. 
Char patterns on the fallen bus bars appear the same as those on the bus 
insulation retained on the overhead circumferential bus bar ring. Thus, we 
assume that thermal damage was sustained before the bus bars fell to the 
347-foot elevation. 
Thermal damage to polar crane components appears relatively uniform. 
Reviewed photographs showed no apparent shadowing or shielding effects, as 
though all burned and melted materials were engulfed in flame or hot gas 
for a short period. No evidence of a pressure pulse was found on polar 
crane components; the crane is designed to sustain overpressure conditions. 
Possible Hydrogen Dispersal Mechanisms in the Polar Crane Region 
Reaction of a hydrogen and air mixture in the polar crane region was 
apparently uniform, and possibly was constrained to circulation patterns 
created by cooling fan flow directions. Two loss-of-coolant accident 
(LOCA) vents^ convey a major portion of cooling system air to overhead 
a. LOCA vents provide a discharge path for the air coolers. LOCA dampers, 
which control flow to the LOCA vents, open in the presence of a high 
containment-pressure signal (3.58 psig). 
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regions of the reactor building on the south wall. (Both vents were to the 
right side of the polar crane position during the accident.) Circulation 
patterns during normal cooling operations draw air from the 305-, 347-, and 
282-foot elevations and exhaust through the D-rings (personnel shields). 
During the accident the LOCA vent dampers were automatically opened fol-
lowing reactor building isolation. Since no record exists of operators 
manually closing the LUCA vent dampers, efflux from the air coolers was 
directed through the LOCA dampers and discharged to the upper containment 
regions during much of the accident sequence. Cooling fan flow directions 
may account for burn patterns on the crane, and also on the 347-foot 
elevation of the reactor building. 
Thermal Damage on the 347-foot Elevation 
Burn patterns on materials located on the south half of 347-foot 
elevation and the top of D-ring do not define whether thermal radiation or 
direct flame contact was responsible for observed thermal damage. Fig-
ures 14 through 28 show examples of burning and melting that could be 
causeo by either flame contact, convection from high temperature gas, or 
thermal radiation from burning hydrogen and air remote from the damage. 
Intensity of thermal damage appears to be uniform toward the south 
half of the reactor building and between the D-rings. Char patterns on the 
scaffolding on the head alignment tool, and charring of the exposed surface 
of the plywood backing of the telephone stand attached to the south wall, 
along with softening of telephone plastic and the apparent burn pattern on 
telephone lines, indicate heat exposure sufficient to raise material 
temperature several hundred degrees Celsius. Fire consumed maintenance 
manuals and plastic light covers. 
Uniform thermal damage to a plywood box next to the northeast arc of 
the east D-ring and melted polymers on the east side of the reactor 
building contrast sharply with lack of thermal damage to the extension of 
the open stairwell "chicken wire" support, a wood 2 x 4 inch frame which 
restricts access to the top of the west D-ring. Similarly, the partially 
burned manual on the north containment wall (Figure 17) appears to be the 
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most westerly extension of thermal damage along the north containment 
regions, since undamaged fabric items were observed next to the northeast 
limit of west D-ring. 
Figures 25 through 28 show thermal damage and burning of auxiliary 
fuel handling bridge control buttons, and burning of manuals on the deck 
next to the north side of the control panel. Thermal intensity appears to 
be similar to that of the south reactor building area. The control and 
power cable festoon exhibit thermal damage to insulation on the side away 
from the wall (Figure 27), indicating a relatively uniform exposure in the 
region between the D-rings. 
Total Surface Heat Exposure at a 347-foot Elevation Location 
Our preliminary estimates lead us to believe that in at least one area 
of the reactor building, the total surface heat exposure or heat flux 
2 2 
during the accident was greater than 3 W/cm (9500 BTU/hr-ft ). In 
estimating possible total surface heat exposures we studied the charred 
scaffolding shown in Figures 14 and 15. The minimum charring temperature 
for such wood is around 300°C, and the minimum total surface heat exposure, 2 or heat flux, required to produce the charring is 3 W/cm . We assumed 
that the scaffolding was probably covered with polyethylene film (an 
assumption based on the patterns of the variations in the char and the 
presence of adhesive tape), so the polyethylene had to melt before the wood 2 could char. At a minimum heat flux of 3 W/cm , this polyethylene-covered 
board would take hundreds of seconds to char. However, since accident 
records indicate the hydrogen burn did not last for hundreds of seconds, 
but rather for tens of seconds, total heat flux near the charred scaf-
2 folding hao to be greater than 3 W/cm in order to produce the observed 
damage. 
Thermal Damage on the 305-foot Elevation 
Figure 29 shows one of the only indications of possible thermal damage 
on the 305-foot elevation level. Here the telephone cord relaxed and may 
exhibit some charring on the front surface. The control buttons for the 
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elevator were also thermally deformed. However, a wooden step!adder to the 
left of this telephone had no thermal damage. Figure 30 shows undamaged 
shoring wood located in the northwest area of the 305-foot elevation. 
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PRELIMINARY DAMAGE PATTERN ESlIhATES 
Figures 31 through 33 are photographs of the styrofoam model on which 
damage patterns were plotted according to photographs from the first 
15 reactor building entries. Ihis model currently resides at the EG&6 Idaho 
site office at ThI. New information about thermal and overpressure damage 
recorded during subsequent reactor building entries is being added to the 
model to increase the accuracy of the damage pattern. 
Very tentative patterns can be proposed with the limited information 
available to this analysis. While much more information is required before 
credance can be given to interpretations of thermal or overpressure damage, 
we do offer the following preliminary estimates based on our data. 
1. Blast or overpressure damage appears to be localized in regions 
around the elevator and enclosed stairwell complex. More indica-
tions of blast damage may exist in basement regions which, 
because of radiological hazards, have not yet been surveyed. 
2. Thermal damage to polar crane components appears uniform. Dis-
charge of the air coolers through the LOCA ducts may have been a 
primary dispersal mechanism of hydrogen and air to the polar 
crane region. No evidence of overpressure damage was found on 
polar crane components. 
3. Thermal damage on the 347-foot elevation exists in north, east, 
and south quadrants, while none is found in the west quadrant 
behind the D-ring. These patterns may follow flow paths developed 
by discharge of the air coolers through the LOCA ducts. 
4. Photographs of the 305-foot elevation indicate no thermal damage 
in that area. Thermal damage to the telephone cord and elevator 
buttons could have resulted from hot gas emission from the 
distorted elevator and stairwell doors. 
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Much more intormatlon will be required before the full extent and 
range of the hydrogen burn during the accident is understood. Further 
close examination of various thermally-damaged items located in southern 
areas of the 347-foot elevation might allow a better estimate of exposure 
intensity than is now available. Appendix A lists specific recommendations 
for further data acquisition required to support a more complete hydrogen 
burn oaniage assessment. 
Studying such fine fuels as thin films, paper, cloth, and thin insu-
lated wire which respond to constant energy exposure in predictable ways 
relative to their composition and geometry could yield more precise data on 
the burn. Another strategy to further define exposure conditions is to 
attempt to duplicate the thermal damage in a laboratory with a reasonable 
set of experimental sources. As more information of this nature is 
gathered, investigators can compile a more complete set of facts with which 
to understand the full nature and extent of hydrogen burn damage at TMI-2. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DATA COLLECTION FROM 
lMI-2 TO SUPPORT HYDROGEN BURN DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 

APPENDIX A 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DATA COLLECTION FROM 
TMI-2 TO SUPPORT HYDROGEN BURN DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
305-foot Elevation 
1. Close-up or red telephone core: especially lock for char or melt on 
exposure surface 
2. Loci' opening material; polyethylene foam 
3. Arsy char or soot pattern on woocen stepladder 
4. View cf trcnt of side stairwell door 
5. Condition of plastic buttons around corner 1 r(«ip red phone 
t. Thickness anc constructicn of elevator doors (both levels) 
7. Construction description and natural ventilation of enclosed stair^well 
complex, i.e., major openings not including doors. 
347-toot Elfcvetior' 
1. Plywood panel: Back surface appearance, edge appearance. Ascertain 
it black surface coat can be scrapea off to clean wood; if so, 
estimate char depth. 
2. hemp rope near reactor coolant pump stand (east side vent duct). 
Status of burn £vidence--tunction of height. 
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Conoition of electrical conductors on polar crane, especially burn 
pattern on pendant. 
Close-up of telephone cord from melted telephone behina indexing fix-
ture. Appearance cf wire insulation above metal bracket welded to 
reactor builoing containment wall east side of telephone stand. 
12 x 12 inch wood blocks supporting indexing fixture. Any evidence of 
polyethylene melt and possible wood char insioe and outside of the 
ring. 
Wood blocks near telephone stand south wall. Extent of polyethylene 
melt on sides; also, evidence of wood char. 
Burn pattern of plastic-coverea pipe or electrical conductor inside of 
head storage stand. Any char, melt, or burn of cotton wraps. 
Unburned regions as important as burneo regions. 
Description of 12 x 12 inch giraer along southeast D-ring wall across 
from elevator. Char extent and polyethylene melt, it any. 
Survey items hanging on reactor building wall that have good exposure 
to the seismic gap area. Divide the reactor building floor surface 
into 45° segments: note any common patterns at the seismic gap. Also 
photograph bus insulation fallen from polar crane to 347-foot 
elevation. 
Survey D-ring wall hangings; look for same distribution as on reactor 
building wall. Here we need char or scot locations relative to 
positions on the reactor building surface. 
Survey top of D-ring (cords, fire hose, rope, tags); look for melt evi-
dence, char pattern, cord exposure, paint blistering. Lock for same 
pattern as D-ring hangings. 
Top of open stair cage: look for char, displace the 2 x 12 inch 
board, determine any polymer melting. 
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Polar Crane, by Telescope if Necessary 
Detail of bus insulation and conductors along crane travel; detail all 
bus levels. 
Survey of paint blister or other thermal damage along catwalk; include 
top and bottom orientation. 
Directional (if any) blistering, melting, and charring on fire 
extinguisher. 
Pattern of insulation on circumferential bus bars as far as can be 
observed from crane (top, bottom, inside, outside). 
Paint flake on dome, especially parts that might have charred eoges. 
Investigation of cab--e.g., extent of seat and seat back burning. Any 
pattern to incicate rapid quench, e.g., "frozen melting" flow of plastic. 
If feasible, check paint condition on vertical surfaces of box Girders A 
and B i.e., between the girders and on outboard girder surfaces. 
Polar crane end carriages; to the wall and to the center surfaces. Look 
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INFORMATION PERTAINING TO FORMATION OF 
COMBUSTIBLE MIXTURES OF HYDROGEN AND AIR 
Relief valve operation history 
Rupture disk operation history 
Time of cooling fan start 
Time of LOCA damper opening 
Temperature rise on: 
t The 2&2-foot elevation 
• The 305-foot elevation 
• The 347-foot elevation 
• The polar crane 
Specific humidity and ambient temperature on the 347-foot elevation 
prior to accident 
Specific humidity at T + 9 hours on the 347-foot elevation 
National Electric Code rating requirement in electric meters, etc. 

Figures 1 through 5. Overpressure damage. 
21 

Figure 1. Crushed barrels near the elevator door and enclosed stairwell on 
the 347-foot elevation. 
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Figure c. Elevator coor on the 347-foot elevation indicating overpressure 
damage. 
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Figure 4. Elevator ooor on the 305-foot elevation indicating overpressure 
damage. 
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Figures 6 through 13. Thermal damage in the polar crane region. 
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Figure b. burnea end meltec insulation on the polar crane bus bars. 
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Figure 7. Charred insulation on the containment bus. 
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Figure 8. Damage to polar crane bus insulation. 
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Figure 9. "Scalloped" damage to polar crane bus insulation; appears to 
decrease close to crane. 
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Figure 10. Charred hose and charred label on fire extinguisher. 
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Figure 12. Stripped, charred, and blistered paint in the polar crane 
region. 
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Figure 13. Peeling paint on containment wall (behind man) in polar crane 
region. 
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Figure 14. Top view of charred scaffolding with tape shields showing and 
polyethylene cover melted off. Note phone table in back-
ground: front surface of plyhood backing against south wall is 
charreo. 
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Figure 15. Bottom view of charred scaffolding showing tape shields, and 
with polyethylene cover melted off. 
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Figure 17. Charred fnanual along north containment wall on 347-foot 
elevation. 
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Figure 18. Uniformly charred plywood box against D-r1ng wall in the 
southeast area of the 347-foot elevation. 
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Figure 19. Discolored exit sign, burned in right top corner; located in 
the southeast area of the 347-foot elevation. 
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Unburned rag 
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Figure 21. Melted buttons in the southeast area of the 347-foot elevation. 
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Figure 22. Charring and melted door seal niatenal on electrical panel m 
southeast area of the 347-foot elevation. 
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Figure 24. View towards the refueling canal on 347-foot elevation showing 
fallen bus bar from polar crane and charred electrical 
insulation. 
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Figure 25. Burneo and melted buttons on the auxiliary fuel handling bridge 
on the 347-foot elevation. 
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Fiqure 26. Burned manual ana melted earphones on the iuxiliary fuel 
handling bridge on the 347-foot elevation; just below view m 
Figure 25. 
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Figure 27. Electrical festoon for fuel handling bridge, on the 347-foct 
elevation; charred on the exposed surface. 
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Figures 29 through 30. Limited damage en the 305-foot elevation. 
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Figure 29. Thermally relaxed telephone cord on 305-foot, elevation. 
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Figure 30. Undamaged wood shoring on 305-foot elevation. 
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Figures 31 through 34. Model of the TMI-2 reactor building showing damage 
locations. 

Figure 31. Building model south view--305 level. 
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Figure 32. Builaing mooel north view--3(j5 level. 
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